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dc.contributor.authorSirnes, Espen
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-18T09:06:13Z
dc.date.available2007-04-18T09:06:13Z
dc.date.issued2005-10
dc.description.abstractIn this paper a difficult question is answered with a surprisingly simple answer. A monopolist who possesses nested information can earn money from selling it at different levels of precision to investors. The problem is to maximize profits by choosing the optimal distribution of information among the investors. I show that, the optimal distribution is to give all informed investors the same level of precision. The model belying this result is a continuous version of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).en
dc.format.extent266042 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/924
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_743
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Tromsøen
dc.publisherUniversity of Tromsøen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series in economics and management, 2005, nr 8en
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en
dc.subjectdistribution of informationen
dc.subjectfinanceen
dc.subjectasset pricingen
dc.titleHow to distribute informationen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.typeArbeidsnotaten


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