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dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngve
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-18T09:20:37Z
dc.date.available2007-04-18T09:20:37Z
dc.date.issued2006-01
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates a market with strictly complementary inputs, with a particular emphasis on how efficiency can be implemented when the productive firms undertake unobservable effort. It is shown that simple linear sharing rules cannot implement socially optimal effort, but a modified linear sharing rule can implement the first-best outcome and a restricted linear sharing rule can be used to implement the second-best outcome. In addition, problems associated with commitment to the sharing rule is discussed.en
dc.format.extent371772 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/925
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_744
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Tromsøen
dc.publisherUniversity of Tromsøen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series in economics and management, 2006, nr 1en
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.subjectcomplementsen
dc.subjectintermediaryen
dc.subjectcommitmentsen
dc.titleEfficiency in complementary partnerships with competitionen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.typeArbeidsnotaten


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