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dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngve
dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-23T08:55:25Z
dc.date.available2007-04-23T08:55:25Z
dc.date.issued2003-12
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the interconnection incentives for firms that have an installed base of customers and that also compete for new customers. We show that the small firm may be harmed in the competition for new customers if the customers in the installed bases are charged a high price, since this makes the large firm more aggressive. It is also shown that the price charged to the installed base customers affects the incentives that determine interconnection quality. A high price to the installed base may, or may not, make a high interconnection quality likely.en
dc.format.extent292190 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/930
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_730
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Tromsøen
dc.publisherUniversity of Tromsøen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series in economics and management, 2003, nr 10en
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.subjectnetwork externalitiesen
dc.subjectcompetitionen
dc.subjectinterconnectionen
dc.titleDo incumbents have incentives to degrade interconnection quality in the internet?en
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.typeArbeidsnotaten


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