Fragmented property rights, R & D and market structure

dc.contributor.author	Clark, Derek J.
dc.contributor.author	Konrad, Kai A.
dc.date.accessioned	2007-04-23T08:58:56Z
dc.date.available	2007-04-23T08:58:56Z
dc.date.issued	2005-04
dc.description.abstract	Fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms’ willingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new products. This paper studies the interaction between markets for products and markets for intellectual property rights (patents) where product innovation requires several complementary patents, each of which is obtained as the result of a patent race. We show that the multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem and we consider which market structure optimally balances the various incentives that emerge in such a system.	en
dc.format.extent	208521 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10037/934
dc.identifier.urn	URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_739
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Universitetet i Tromsø	en
dc.publisher	University of Tromsø	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper series in economics and management, 2005, nr 4	en
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess
dc.subject	VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212	en
dc.subject	fragmented property rights	en
dc.subject	patents	en
dc.subject	contests	en
dc.subject	hold-up	en
dc.title	Fragmented property rights, R & D and market structure	en
dc.type	Working paper	en
dc.type	Arbeidsnotat	en