Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • Circularity, Naturalism, and Desire-Based Reasons 

      Tanyi, Attila (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017-10)
      In this paper, I propose a critique of the naturalist version of the Desire-Based Reasons Model. I first set the scene by spelling out the connection between naturalism and the Model. After this, I introduce Christine Korsgaard’s circularity argument against what she calls the instrumental principle. Since Korsgaard’s targets, officially, were non-naturalist advocates of the principle, I show why ...
    • The Concept of Entrapment 

      Hill, Daniel J.; McLeod, Stephen K; Tanyi, Attila (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017-08-23)
      Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between <i>legal entrapment</i>, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law-enforcement agents, and <i>civil entrapment</i>, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of ...
    • Institutional consequentialism and global governance 

      Tanyi, Attila; Miklós, András (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2018-03-13)
      Elsewhere we have responded to the so-called demandingness objection to consequentialism – that consequentialism is excessively demanding and is therefore unacceptable as a moral theory – by introducing the theoretical position we call institutional consequentialism. This is a consequentialist view that, however, requires institutional systems, and not individuals, to follow the consequentialist ...
    • Reasons and Beliefs 

      Tanyi, Attila; Morganti, Matteo (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2018)
      The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to maintain both a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and b) that the conception according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is ...