Now showing items 1-12 of 12

    • Circularity, Naturalism, and Desire-Based Reasons 

      Tanyi, Attila (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017-10)
      In this paper, I propose a critique of the naturalist version of the Desire-Based Reasons Model. I first set the scene by spelling out the connection between naturalism and the Model. After this, I introduce Christine Korsgaard’s circularity argument against what she calls the instrumental principle. Since Korsgaard’s targets, officially, were non-naturalist advocates of the principle, I show why ...
    • The Concept of Entrapment 

      Hill, Daniel J.; McLeod, Stephen K; Tanyi, Attila (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017-08-23)
      Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between <i>legal entrapment</i>, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law-enforcement agents, and <i>civil entrapment</i>, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of ...
    • Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions 

      Miklos, Andras; Tanyi, Attila (Preprint; Manuskript, 2020-02-25)
      It isn’t saying much to claim that morality is demanding; the question, rather, is: can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given. Our question, therefore, is how to respond to the Objection. ...
    • Consequentialist Demands, Intuitions and Experimental Methodology 

      Tanyi, Attila; Sweetman, Joe (Preprint; Manuskript, 2020-02-25)
      Can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given and are also not concerned with finding the best response to the Objection. Instead, our main aim is to explicate the intuitive background of the Objection ...
    • Entrapment: From the objection from temptation to the objection from moral alliance 

      Hill, Daniel; McLeod, Stephen; Tanyi, Attila (Preprint; Manuskript, 2020-02-25)
      Entrapment involves two parties: the agent, who entraps, and the target, who is entrapped. When entrapment occurs, the agent procures the target’s act by recommending, requesting or enjoining its performance. When an agent intentionally tempts a target, the agent presents the target with the opportunity to perform an act, with the intention that the target will experience an urge to perform ...
    • Institutional consequentialism and global governance 

      Tanyi, Attila; Miklós, András (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2018-03-13)
      Elsewhere we have responded to the so-called demandingness objection to consequentialism – that consequentialism is excessively demanding and is therefore unacceptable as a moral theory – by introducing the theoretical position we call institutional consequentialism. This is a consequentialist view that, however, requires institutional systems, and not individuals, to follow the consequentialist ...
    • Introduction to special issue on world government 

      Tanyi, Attila (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2019-05-22)
    • Mennyire lehet nehéz? A túlzott követelések ellenvetésének újszerű megközelítései 

      Tanyi, Attila (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel, 2012)
    • On the Road to Meaning 

      Tanyi, Attila (Preprint; Manuskript, 2020-02-25)
      The paper offers a philosophically infused analysis of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. The main idea is that McCarthy’s novel is primarily a statement on the meaning of life. Once this idea is argued for and endorsed, by using a parallel between The Road and a 19th century Hungarian dramatic poem, The Tragedy of Man, the paper goes on to argue that the most plausible – although admittedly not the only ...
    • Reasons and Beliefs 

      Tanyi, Attila; Morganti, Matteo (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2018)
      The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to maintain both a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and b) that the conception according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is ...
    • What are basic liberties? An Essay in Analytical Specification 

      McLeod, Stephen; Tanyi, Attila (Preprint; Manuskript, 2020-02-25)
      Our initial aim is to characterize, in a manner more precise than before, what Rawls calls the “analytical” method of arrival at a list of basic liberties. As we understand it, this method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet in order for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social ...
    • What is the incoherence objection to legal entrapment 

      Hill, Daniel; McLeod, Stephen; Tanyi, Attila (Preprint; Manuskript, 2020-02-25)
      Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more ...