Loss of independence of the Colombian ombudsperson. Clientelism and horizontal accountability in a declining national human rights institution

Abstract

The international status of the Colombian ombuds institution presents a paradoxical scenario. Although the loss of its independence has been documented for almost two decades, it has always received the highest rating from the organization that assesses compliance with international standards. While this is happening, the direction of this State agency continues to be determined by a deficient procedure that gives a leading role to the government and allows the reproduction of clientelistic practices. Starting from this scenario, this dissertation explores how the specialized offices of the United Nations, which have promoted the creation of national human rights bodies and sponsored their periodic evaluation, can act in a more proactive manner in the face of ombuds institutions that are taken over by politicians disinterested in human rights. By presenting an analysis of the profiles of ombudsmen in Colombia, it is shown how, over the last twenty years, this institution has generally ensured both bureaucracy and enabled horizontal accountability to a political elite. A dynamic that openly contradicts the provisions of international standards, as demonstrated by the author based on ethnographic work carried out during four years within this institution, a review of the archives of its human resources department, and a comparison of what has happened in Colombia with other countries of the Andean Community that have maintained election mechanisms more consistent with international standards. At the end, it is recommended that multilateral organizations redesign the tools for evaluating and monitoring national human rights institutions, in order to allow an approach that offers a real diagnosis of each of them and consider better ways to address the performance of those that are highly politicized.