Epistemic Security and the Monopoly on Knowledge

Abstract

If there is one universally known quote from Thomas Hobbes, it is his assertion that without security “there is no place for industry [...] no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Indeed, in the Western context, security is typically construed as freedom from harm and/or the threat thereof, serving as a prerequisite for a thriving and prosperous society. Furthermore, in accordance with the logic presented in Leviathan, security is commonly perceived as something guaranteed by the state, thus rendering it the primary provider of security. <p>

<p>It is unsurprising, then, that since at least the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, security debates have been dominated by the idea of national security, often focused on militarized interpretations that traditionally viewed security as both the highest end and the ultimate means. Broadly speaking, security has been understood in terms of how well a particular state or group of allied states fares in the struggle for power, or how stable the overall balance of power appears. Concurrently, national security has become firmly entrenched as a politically expedient tool for a wide range of factional interests, serving as a justification for various actions and policies. This status quo persisted until the end of the Cold War, when two significant developments emerged: widening of the security realm and its riskification. In the most general sense, riskification refers to the process or tendency of placing increasing emphasis on the perception of risk across various aspects of society, the economy, or decision-making processes. We shall now examine both of these phenomena.