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dc.contributor.advisorHellesnes, Jon
dc.contributor.authorJakobsen, Jonas
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-27T07:18:55Z
dc.date.available2017-04-27T07:18:55Z
dc.date.issued2017-04-21
dc.description.abstractThe thesis analyzes and discusses Jürgen Habermas’ political philosophy, focusing on his theories of multiculturalism and deliberative democracy. This implies an assesment of strengths and weaknesses in Habermas' theory, and an attempt to overcome the weaknesses through some revisions and reinterpretations. More specifically, I apply Habermas' framework to a particular question to which he himself has not paid systematic attention, namely how we should justify and use free speech in culturally diverse democracies. The first part of this question (how to justify free speech) pertains to how we should justify constitutional free speech as political philosophers. Here, I advocate robust free speech guarantees, based on a reading of Habermas' normative theory of (reflexive, political, and private) freedom. I argue that legal regulations of hate speech (i.e. racist speech) may be legitimate, but not regulations of blasphemy and religious offense. The second part (how to use free speech) pertains to the citizens’ use of free speech in culturally diverse contexts, and thus transcends the focus on mere legality. Here, I argue that the same concern with freedom that justifies free speech as a constitutional right also limits free speech - in a pragmatic and moral sense. The pragmatic sense refers to how hate speech and misrecognition harm the social preconditions for freedom, in particular the freedom of members of weak or marginalized groups. The moral sense in which freedom limits freedom refers to norms of equal recognition that guide (or should guide) public deliberation between persons who respect each other as free and equal. Even though the imperative of equal recognition does not require us to recognize others' cultural identities or respect their religious feelings as such, it does require us to take their cultural attachments into account when interacting - and deliberating - with them.en_US
dc.description.doctoraltypeph.d.en_US
dc.description.popularabstractHvordan begrunner vi retten til ytringsfrihet? Hvor går ytringsfrihetens grenser? Hvordan bør ansvarlige borgere bruke ytringsfriheten sin i demokratisk debatt og meningsdannelse? Avhandlingen diskuterer disse spørsmål på bakgrunn av en kritisk lesning av Jürgen Habermas' teorier om deliberativt demokrati og multikulturalisme. Det første spørsmål besvares i henhold til en normativ teori om menneskelig frihet i tre betydninger: som (a) refleksivt vesen, (b) politisk deltaker og (c) privatperson. I diskusjonen av det andre spørsmål argumenteres det for at kriminalisering av hatprat (f.eks. rasistiske ytringer) kan være legitim, men ikke av blasfemi og religionsfornærmelse. Det tredje spørsmål besvares gjennom en diskusjon av betydningen av anerkjennelse og gjensidig respekt i offentlig debatt og kommunikasjon.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10037/10962
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUiT Norges arktiske universiteten_US
dc.publisherUiT The Arctic University of Norwayen_US
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.subject.courseIDDOKTOR-001
dc.subjectVDP::Humaniora: 000::Filosofiske fag: 160::Filosofi: 161en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Humanities: 000::Philosophical disciplines: 160::Philosophy: 161en_US
dc.titleThe Claims of Freedom: Habermas' Deliberative Multiculturalism and the Right to Free Speechen_US
dc.typeDoctoral thesisen_US
dc.typeDoktorgradsavhandlingen_US


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