Democracy without Enlightenment: A Jury Theorem for Evaluative Voting
Permanent lenke
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/18805Dato
2020-07-08Type
Journal articleTidsskriftartikkel
Peer reviewed
Forfatter
Morreau, MichaelSammendrag
This article takes up a question about the quality of judgments and decisions made by collective grading: under which conditions are outcomes likely to be right? An answer comes in the form of a jury theorem for median grading. Here, the collective grade for a thing is the median of its individually assigned grades—the one in the middle, when all of them are listed from top to bottom. Section III prepares the ground for this theorem by discussing different senses in which grades can be the right ones for things, or the wrong ones as the case may be, independently of which grades are assigned in the end. These notions of right and wrong are relevant to judgments of different kinds of things: risks, research proposals, job candidates, options in referendums and elections. The grading‐jury theorem in Section V identifies conditions on the grading competence of individual people under which median grades, and decisions that follow them, are likely to be, independently, right.