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dc.contributor.authorTanyi, Attila
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T07:53:48Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T07:53:48Z
dc.date.issued2015-10-22
dc.description.abstractMorality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we find that moral theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be demanding. However, there is at least one moral theory – consequentialism – that is said to be beset by this demandingness problem. This calls for an explanation: Why only consequentialism? This then leads to related questions: What is the demandingness problematic about? What exactly does it claim? Finally, there is the question of what we do if we accept that there is a demandingness problem for consequentialism: How can consequentialists respond? The present chapter sets out to answer these questions (or at least point to how they could be answered).en_US
dc.descriptionSource at <a href=https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/bloomsbury-companion-to-analytic-philosophy-9781474236492/>https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/bloomsbury-companion-to-analytic-philosophy-9781474236492/</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.citationTanyi A: Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism. In: Dainton, Robinson. Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy, 2015. Bloomsbury Academic p. 500-527en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1596634
dc.identifier.isbn9781474236485
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/27239
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherBloomsbury Academicen_US
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.titleMoral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialismen_US
dc.type.versionsubmittedVersionen_US
dc.typeChapteren_US
dc.typeBokkapittelen_US


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