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dc.contributor.authorAndersson, Anna-Karin Margareta
dc.contributor.authorJohansson, Kjell Arne
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-18T13:12:11Z
dc.date.available2023-09-18T13:12:11Z
dc.date.issued2018-03-02
dc.description.abstractThere are two main ways of understanding the function of surrogate decision making in a legal context: the Best Interests Standard and the Substituted Judgment Standard. First, we will argue that the Best Interests Standard is difficult to apply to unconscious patients. Application is difficult regardless of whether they have ever been conscious. Second, we will argue that if we accept the least problematic explanation of how unconscious patients can have interests, we are also obliged to accept that the Substituted Judgment Standard can be coherently applied to patients who have never been conscious at the same extent as the Best Interests Standard. We then argue that acknowledging this result is important in order to show patients respect.en_US
dc.identifier.citationAndersson AM, Johansson KA. Substituted decision making and the dispositional choice account. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2018:1-7en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1564334
dc.identifier.doi10.1136/medethics-2016-103672
dc.identifier.issn0306-6800
dc.identifier.issn1473-4257
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/31083
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherBMJ Publishing Groupen_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Medical Ethics
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2018 The Author(s)en_US
dc.titleSubstituted decision making and the dispositional choice accounten_US
dc.type.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


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