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dc.contributor.authorLabukt, Ivar Russøy
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-22T13:34:42Z
dc.date.available2023-11-22T13:34:42Z
dc.date.issued2023-08-17
dc.description.abstractI present some problems for phenomenal (i.e. consciousness-based) accounts of personal identity and egoistic concern. These accounts typically rely on continuity in the capacity for consciousness to explain how we survive ordinary periods of unconsciousness such as dreamless sleep. I offer some thought experiments where continuity in the capacity for consciousness does not seem sufficient for survival and some where it does not seem necessary. There are ways of modifying the standard phenomenal approach so as to avoid these difficulties, but I argue that they all lead to other problems that are no less serious.en_US
dc.identifier.citationLabukt. Some Problems for the Phenomenal Approach to Personal Identity. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. 2023en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 2184287
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10670-023-00722-2
dc.identifier.issn0165-0106
dc.identifier.issn1572-8420
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/31849
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Natureen_US
dc.relation.journalErkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2023 The Author(s)en_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0en_US
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)en_US
dc.titleSome Problems for the Phenomenal Approach to Personal Identityen_US
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


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Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)