Sartrean Nothingness and the Need for Meaning. Navigating the Human Condition and Existentialist Morality Through Authenticity

Abstract

The (im)possibility of grounding an ethics based on Jean-Paul Sartre’s ontology in Being and Nothingness has been a central discussion for many years. In this thesis, I contribute to the discourse by offering a discussion on Sartrean authenticity. The aim is to explore how authenticity can be used to navigate the human condition, as presented by Sartre and to discuss how it can be understood as a moral term. To do so, I begin with an analysis of Sartre’s understanding of the human condition, followed by a discussion on why authenticity should be viewed as an appropriate way of navigating through this condition and life in general. Lastly, I will discuss how authenticity can be implemented as a moral term and how it can be applied to make moral judgements. Authenticity, as I argue, enables us as meaning-seeking creatures to create meaning in an inherently meaningless world. It is therefore we should choose authenticity over a life in bad faith. I will also discuss how treating others authentically benefits not only ourselves, but others as well. In the last chapter, I argue that Sartrean authenticity is best understood as a moral virtue, show how this virtue can be applied and discuss its potentials and limitations.