Needs, harms, and liberalism
Permanent lenke
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/37493Dato
2025Type
Journal articleTidsskriftartikkel
Peer reviewed
Sammendrag
The harm principle entails the subprinciple that harm to others provides a pro tanto moral
reason for legal or social coercion. We address a ‘scope problem’ for that subprinciple: how
can what counts as harm be restricted sufficiently, without sacrificing extensional adequacy, to
protect the harm principle’s liberal credentials? While recognizing the centrality of such basic
liberties as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of movement to any
liberalism worthy of the name, a satisfactory solution to the scope problem must secure a
distinction between conduct that harms others and conduct that, while it might negatively affect
others (casually or relationally), does not harm them. We ground such a distinction in a further
distinction between needs and attitudes.
Beskrivelse
Authors accepted manuscript - submitted to Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (CRISPP): https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fcri20/current.
Forlag
Taylor & FrancisSitering
McLeod SK, Shaw, Tanyi A. Needs, harms, and liberalism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (CRISPP). 2025Metadata
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Copyright 2025 The Author(s)