Synonymy and the a priori: A problem for Boghossian's model
According to Paul Boghossian, some truths are knowable a priori because they are expressed by epistemically analytic sentences. In such cases, understanding the sentence is meant to suffice for justified belief in the proposition it expresses. One alleged route from understanding to justification goes via what Boghossian calls 'the synonymy model'. This article presents a dilemma for this model and argues that although a strategy for avoiding the dilemma is available, this does not vindicate Boghossian's model.
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record Nyseth, F. (2017). Synonymy and the a priori: A problem for Boghossian's model. Analysis, 77(3), 559-565 is available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx114