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dc.contributor.authorNyseth, Fredrik
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-09T11:07:09Z
dc.date.available2018-07-09T11:07:09Z
dc.date.issued2017-08-03
dc.description.abstractAccording to Paul Boghossian, some truths are knowable a priori because they are expressed by epistemically analytic sentences. In such cases, understanding the sentence is meant to suffice for justified belief in the proposition it expresses. One alleged route from understanding to justification goes via what Boghossian calls 'the synonymy model'. This article presents a dilemma for this model and argues that although a strategy for avoiding the dilemma is available, this does not vindicate Boghossian's model.en_US
dc.descriptionThis is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record Nyseth, F. (2017). Synonymy and the a priori: A problem for Boghossian's model. Analysis, 77(3), 559-565 is available online at: <a href=http://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx114> http://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx114</a>en_US
dc.identifier.citationNyseth, F. (2017). Synonymy and the a priori: A problem for Boghossian's model. Analysis, 77(3), 559-565. http://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx114en_US
dc.identifier.issn0003-2638
dc.identifier.issn1467-8284
dc.identifier.otherFRIDAID 1542723
dc.identifier.other10.1093/analys/anx114
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/13187
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.journalAnalysis
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.subjectVDP::Humaniora: 000::Filosofiske fag: 160en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Humanities: 000::Philosophical disciplines: 160en_US
dc.titleSynonymy and the a priori: A problem for Boghossian's modelen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


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