Merger and bilateral bargaining : A note

dc.contributor.author	Clark, Derek J.
dc.contributor.author	Musy, Olivier
dc.contributor.author	Pereau, Jean Christophe
dc.date.accessioned	2009-03-17T08:40:58Z
dc.date.available	2009-03-17T08:40:58Z
dc.date.issued	2008-02-05
dc.description.abstract	In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain simultaneously or in sequence.	en
dc.format.extent	166006 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10037/1814
dc.identifier.urn	URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_1578
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Universitetet i Tromsø	en
dc.publisher	The University of Tromsø	en
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess
dc.subject	VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213	en
dc.subject	bargaining	en
dc.subject	Shapley value	en
dc.subject	pivotal player	en
dc.subject	buyer merger	en
dc.title	Merger and bilateral bargaining : A note	en
dc.type	Working paper	en
dc.type	Arbeidsnotat	en