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dc.contributor.authorBarreda-Tarrazona, Iván
dc.contributor.authorKundu, Tapas
dc.contributor.authorØstbye, Stein
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-04T09:20:18Z
dc.date.available2021-03-04T09:20:18Z
dc.date.issued2021-02-05
dc.description.abstractThis paper adapts the canonical New Economic Geography model for experimental testing of the model's behavioral assumptions by developing a finite-player, finite-horizon dynamic game of migration. Our analysis gives distinctive predictions when migration is consistent with myopic behavior (MB) and when it is consistent with sequentially rational or perfect forward-looking behavior (FB). These alternatives are tested in an economic laboratory experiment with increasing number of agents in different treatments. Results show that perfect FB loses ground against MB as the number of agents and periods increases, and this number may be surprisingly small.en_US
dc.identifier.citationBarreda-Tarrazona, Kundu T, Østbye s. On rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography: An experimental analysis. Regional Science and Urban Economics. 2021;87(3)en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1894942
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2021.103654
dc.identifier.issn0166-0462
dc.identifier.issn1879-2308
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/20642
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.journalRegional Science and Urban Economics
dc.relation.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166046221000144?via%3Dihub
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2021 The Author(s)en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Social science: 200en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200en_US
dc.titleOn rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography: An experimental analysisen_US
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


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