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dc.contributor.authorBirkelund, Johan
dc.contributor.authorCherry, Todd
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-25T20:14:14Z
dc.date.available2021-10-25T20:14:14Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-10
dc.description.abstractThis paper reports on an experiment that investigates how inequality in advantage affects individual preferences for honesty and generosity. In a two-stage experiment, subjects first earn money according to self-reported production, which can include honest and dishonest reports. Subjects then play the dictator game and decide how much, if any, of their earnings to share with an anonymous recipient. Treatments investigate how equal and unequal advantages in production affect the extent of cheating in stage one and the subsequent offers in stage two. When advantage randomly benefits only some of the group, the relatively disadvantaged are significantly more dishonest and exhibit significantly less other-regarding behavior. Considering the interplay between cheating and giving, we find that greater cheating was followed with greater giving. And comparing this relationship across treatments suggests self-justification for dishonest behavior makes subjects feel more entitled to their ill-gotten gains.en_US
dc.identifier.citationBirkelund, Cherry T. Institutional inequality and individual preferences for honesty and generosity. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2020;170:355-361en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1796528
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.014
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.issn1879-1751
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/22816
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2020 The Author(s)en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Social sciences: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212en_US
dc.titleInstitutional inequality and individual preferences for honesty and generosityen_US
dc.type.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


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