Replication and Fait in Science: Implications of Tacit Knowledge

Abstract

In this paper we revisit Michael Polanyi’s overall contribution to the understanding of tacit knowledge and its implications in philosophy of science with a focus on experimental research in social sciences. We first review and discuss Polanyi’s references to experiments in general. An extensive number of these experiments are summarised in tabular form in the Appendix, distinguishing between experiments on the phenomenon of tacit knowledge, discussed in Sect. 2.2.1, and experiments on the epistemological implications of tacit knowledge, discussed in Sect. 2.2.2. Secondly, we discuss tacit knowledge as a confounding factor and limitation to replicability in social science experiments (Sect. 2.3.1) and tacit knowledge as a phenomenon to be elicited through controlled variation in experimental design (Sect. 2.3.2). In the concluding section, we call for a rejuvenation of the study of social epistemology and the social construction of science, suggested to start with Polanyi and his generation, where attention now should be directed to social science rather than hard science as in the past.