Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorAanesen, Margrethe
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-08T10:09:30Z
dc.date.available2012-06-08T10:09:30Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractIn some bargaining situations, agreement has implications for agents beyond the parties involved, and if so, delays in reaching an agreement or failing to reach an agreement, when this would be profitable, may imply significant welfare losses. The question raised in this paper is whether the intervention of a government, who has a positive valuation of agreement and therefore offers a subsidy, will reduce such delays and inabilities to reach agreement? Based on a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a sequential bargaining game with intervention, we show that in equilibrium intervention always reduces the ex ante equilibrium inefficiency and conditionally reduces expected delays in trade. However, for intervention in the form of a subsidy to take place, the aggregate of the seller’s reservation price and the externalities must be (almost) as high as the buyer’s upper valuation limit.en
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economics 105(2012) nr. 2 s. 145-160en
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 923075
dc.identifier.doidoi: 10.1007/s00712-011-0220-1
dc.identifier.issn0931-8658
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/4225
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_3940
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212en
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.titleSequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public interventionen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen
dc.typePeer revieweden


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel