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dc.contributor.authorKundu, Tapas
dc.contributor.authorBhattacharya, Sourav
dc.contributor.authorDeb, Joyee
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-04T13:37:48Z
dc.date.available2016-03-04T13:37:48Z
dc.date.issued2015-02
dc.description.abstractWe study the role of intergroup mobility in the emergence of conflict. Two groups compete for the right to allocate society's resources. We allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, which the opposition can accept or reject, and wage conflict. Agents can also switch group membership. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting opposition members, but implies a higher threat of conflict. Our main finding is that the possibility of intergroup mobility affects the likelihood of conflict in a nonmonotonic way. Open conflict can arise at intermediate costs of mobility. (JEL D71, D72, D74)en_US
dc.descriptionAccepted manuscript version. Published version at <a href=http://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130055>http://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130055</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.citationAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2015, 7(1):281-319en_US
dc.identifier.cristinIDFRIDAID 1213580
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/mic.20130055
dc.identifier.issn1945-7685
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/8707
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_8262
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectConflicten_US
dc.subjectinter-group mobilityen_US
dc.subjectpolitical competitionen_US
dc.subjectresource allocationen_US
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210en_US
dc.subjectVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210en_US
dc.titleMobility and Conflicten_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typeTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US


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