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dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek J.
dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-23T08:58:56Z
dc.date.available2007-04-23T08:58:56Z
dc.date.issued2005-04
dc.description.abstractFragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms’ willingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new products. This paper studies the interaction between markets for products and markets for intellectual property rights (patents) where product innovation requires several complementary patents, each of which is obtained as the result of a patent race. We show that the multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem and we consider which market structure optimally balances the various incentives that emerge in such a system.en
dc.format.extent208521 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/934
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_739
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Tromsøen
dc.publisherUniversity of Tromsøen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series in economics and management, 2005, nr 4en
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.subjectfragmented property rightsen
dc.subjectpatentsen
dc.subjectcontestsen
dc.subjecthold-upen
dc.titleFragmented property rights, R & D and market structureen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.typeArbeidsnotaten


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