Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek J.
dc.contributor.authorRiis, Christian
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-03T07:50:07Z
dc.date.available2007-05-03T07:50:07Z
dc.date.issued2006-09
dc.description.abstractWe consider a pie-splitting game involving three committee members. In response to the large literature on sequential procedures in this type of game, we propose an institution that is inspired by auction theory. The (sealed) bids of the players are proposals for a distribution of the pie and are given simultaneously. If any of the bids is preferred to all others in a pairwise comparison (i.e. a Condorcet winner exists) then this proposal is implemented. If such a bid does not exist then an equal split of the pie is assumed. An equilibrium of this game is for each player to suggest that one of the opponents should receive the lion’s share of the pie, even though each player cares only about his own share. We call this phenomenon “rational benevolence”. Although the end that is desired by the players is purely egoistic, the means of achieving it may be perceived as benevolent. Several applications of the game are suggested.en
dc.format.extent133095 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/946
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_754
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Tromsøen
dc.publisherUniversity of Tromsøen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series in economics and management, 2006, nr 10en
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.subjectcommitteesen
dc.subjectauctionsen
dc.titleRational benevolence in small committeesen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.typeArbeidsnotaten


File(s) in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following collection(s)

Show simple item record