The Long and Winding Polar Silk Road: Explaining China’s Limited Success in Policy Implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Arctic

Abstract

China developed the elusive ‘Polar Silk Road’ policy around 2017. The Polar Silk Road connects China’s Arctic policy with the global Belt and Road Initiative, and aims to increase Chinese activity within shipping, infrastructure construction and resource development in the Arctic region. In the eight years that have passed since, the policy has produced remarkably few concrete results. This thesis seeks to explain why this is the case and asks why the Polar Silk Road has achieved limited success so far. The investigation is directed by expectations derived from two theories of international relations, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and Wendt’s version of constructivism. Through an explaining outcome process-tracing case study the investigation advances an explanatory mechanism consisting of six parts. It finds that the form of the Polar Silk Road collided with Arctic governance norms, creating opposition among the Arctic states. Although Russia formally supported the policy, underlying strategic competition constrained mutual trust and Sino-Russian cooperation. In the rest of the Arctic, widespread suspicion toward China’s Arctic ambitions led to heightened scrutiny and hindered the formation of productive partnerships. Deteriorating relations between Russia and the West following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine further impeded China’s efforts to advance a multilateral cooperative framework. Additionally, Arctic shipping developed more slowly than expected, which curtailed China’s interest. Finally, the Polar Silk Road enjoyed a relatively low priority among China’s foreign policies in the period, limiting its progress amid rising resistance against it.