• Why potential entry may increase platform sponsors' profit 

      Foros, Øystein; Sand, Jan Yngve; Kind, Hans Jarle (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-09)
      In this paper we analyze the incentives for platform sponsors to open up their networks for independent rivals. We show that open access may increase the platform sponsors’ profit levels and enhance quality improving investments.
    • How to distribute information 

      Sirnes, Espen (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-10)
      In this paper a difficult question is answered with a surprisingly simple answer. A monopolist who possesses nested information can earn money from selling it at different levels of precision to investors. The problem is to maximize profits by choosing the optimal distribution of information among the investors. I show that, the optimal distribution is to give all informed investors the same ...
    • License fees. The case of Norwegian salmon farming 

      Roland, B.-E.; Färe, Rolf; Grosskopf, Shawna; Weber, William L. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-10)
      The Norwegian salmon farming industry is one of the most important Norwegian export industries. The industry is also regulated to secure balanced and sustainable development. Current regulatory practice consists of licensing access to sea water. The government recently set an upper bound on the license fees; the purpose of our paper is to estimate the shadow price of the property right to determine ...
    • Water demand and the urban poor. A study of the factors influencing water consumption among housholds in Cape Town, South Africa 

      Jansen, Ada; Schulz, Carl-Erik (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-01)
      Water demand management is a key focus area for most water managers and even more so in developing countries. Improved access to water is important to the poor. Water scarcity makes efficient management even more urgent and it creates more conflicts in water distribution. Different policies have been introduced to ensure a water management system that cares for the poor, among them the Increasing ...
    • Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition 

      Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-01)
      This paper investigates a market with strictly complementary inputs, with a particular emphasis on how efficiency can be implemented when the productive firms undertake unobservable effort. It is shown that simple linear sharing rules cannot implement socially optimal effort, but a modified linear sharing rule can implement the first-best outcome and a restricted linear sharing rule can be used ...
    • Nature reserves as a bioeconomic management tool. A simplified modeling approach 

      Flåten, Ola; Mjølhus, Einar (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-02)
      This paper demonstrates analytically how a nature reserve may protect the total population, realize maximum sustainable yield (MSY), maximum economic yield (MEY) and consumer surplus (CS) and how this depends on biological growth, migration, reserve size and economic parameters. The pre-reserve population is assumed to follow the logistic growth law and two post-reserve growth models are discussed. ...
    • Aquaculture-fisheries interactions 

      Mikkelsen, Eirik (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-02)
      Assuming externalities from aquaculture to fisheries, we use a Verhulst-Schaefer model of fish population-dynamics and production, coupled with an aquaculture production model, to investigate effects on open-access and rent-maximising fisheries. Externalities are modelled by letting carrying capacity, intrinsic growth rate or catchability coefficient in the fishery depend on aquaculture production. ...
    • A note on the ecological-economic modelling of marine reserves in fisheries 

      Armstrong, Claire W. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-03)
      This paper gives an overview of bioeconomic modelling of marine reserves, and illustrates how economists have responded to the modelling results found in the ecological literature. The economic analysis is shown to be far more pessimistic with regard to the potential of marine reserves as a fisheries management tool, than what one finds in the purely ecological analysis, the reason being the ...
    • Is migration important for regional convergence? Comparative evidence for Norwegian and Swedish counties, 1980-2000 

      Westerlund, Olle; Østbye, Stein (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-06)
      Regional convergence studies have relied on net migration data in assessing the impact of migration. With heterogeneous labour, the implied symmetrical treatment of immigration and emigration cannot be justified a priori.. Because of heterogeneity among migrants, gross migration flows may lead to considerable interregional redistribution of human capital even when net migration is zero. Moreover, ...
    • Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries 

      Clark, Derek J.; Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-06-26)
      This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition outcome is one between the two most ...
    • Fokus på økonomien i de nordiske fiskerier. Sjarkfiske med 8-14,9 m båter i Norge 

      Eriksen, Guri Hjallen; Flåten, Ola (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09)
    • Product and process innovation in a differentiated goods duopoly 

      Clark, Derek J.; Armstrong, Claire W. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09)
      This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D competition or cooperation, where R&D may affect both unit cost of production and the size of the market. This combination of product and process innovation is shown to allow for the reversal of some results found in earlier models that only look at one of the two types of R&D effects. We find that for a ...
    • Rational benevolence in small committees 

      Clark, Derek J.; Riis, Christian (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09)
      We consider a pie-splitting game involving three committee members. In response to the large literature on sequential procedures in this type of game, we propose an institution that is inspired by auction theory. The (sealed) bids of the players are proposals for a distribution of the pie and are given simultaneously. If any of the bids is preferred to all others in a pairwise comparison (i.e. ...
    • Bargaining with asymmetric externalities 

      Pereau, Jean Christophe; Clark, Derek J. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)
      We consider sequential bargaining between three firms that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the firms is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other firms have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...
    • The all-pay auction with cross-shareholdings 

      Clark, Derek J.; Konrad, Kai A.; Riis, Christian (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)
      We consider an all-pay auction between several firms under asymmetric information in which each firm owns a share in its rival. We characterize the equilibrium and show how much these cross-shareholdings serve to dampen competition. Additionally, we explain why the well known relationship between the equilibrium strategies of the standard first price and all-pay auctions breaks down in our setting.
    • R&D and knowledge transfer strategies 

      Clark, Derek J.; Østbye, Stein E. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-04)
      We study the incentives for firms to share knowledge when they engage in R&D in order to make an uncertain innovation. The ini- tial stock of knowledge may be unevely distributed, and we look at how this affects the type of cooperative agreements that the firms will find it profitable to enter in to. Specifically, we consider the cases in which firms share initial knowledge only (reciprocal ...
    • Petrodevelopment 2030: Socio-economic consequences of an extensive oil and gas development in the Barents Sea 

      Didyk, Vladimir; Arbo, Peter; Nilssen, Inge Berg; Hersoug, Bjørn; Nygaard, Vigdis; Sand, Jan Yngve; Østbye, Stein; Riabova, Larissa (Research report; Forskningsrapport, 2007-10)
      The theme of this report is the regional socio-economic consequences of an extensive oil and gas development in the Barents Sea. The regional focus area includes Finnmark County and Murmansk Oblast. The introductory chapter explains the purpose of the study and the way the work has been done. The next two chapters provide a detailed account of the region and its basic characteristics. The general ...
    • Simultaneous versus sequential offers in dominant player bargaining 

      Clark, Derek J.; Pereau, Jean Christophe (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-01-10)
      We consider bargaining between a number of players that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the players is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other players have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...
    • Merger and bilateral bargaining : A note 

      Clark, Derek J.; Musy, Olivier; Pereau, Jean Christophe (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-02-05)
      In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain ...
    • Regional policy analysis in a simple NEG model with vertical linkages. 

      Østbye, Stein (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-03)
      The paper presents a simple three-region, two-sector general equilibrium model that is used for analysing the effect of regional tax policies. The model includes exogenous asymmetry in terms of transport costs as well as a vertical industry structure that can account for endogenous location development in order to distinguish between the effect of ‘first nature’ and ‘second nature’ on the required ...