Bargaining with asymmetric externalities
Sammendrag
We consider sequential bargaining between three firms that are all
essential in creating a surplus. One of the firms is dominant in the
sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created.
The other firms have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for
themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it
profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller firms have pref-
erences over who they take their share from. Of all of the bargaining
protocols that we consider, we identify the set of Pareto optimal pro-
tocols, and show which of them will be uniquely preferred by each
firm.
Forlag
Universitetet i TromsøUniversity of Tromsø
Serie
Working paper series in economics and management, 2007, nr 2Metadata
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