dc.contributor.author | Clark, Derek J. | |
dc.contributor.author | Pereau, Jean Christophe | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-05-03T08:00:46Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-05-03T08:00:46Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-02 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider sequential bargaining between three firms that are all
essential in creating a surplus. One of the firms is dominant in the
sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created.
The other firms have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for
themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it
profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller firms have pref-
erences over who they take their share from. Of all of the bargaining
protocols that we consider, we identify the set of Pareto optimal pro-
tocols, and show which of them will be uniquely preferred by each
firm. | en |
dc.format.extent | 186800 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10037/948 | |
dc.identifier.urn | URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_756 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Universitetet i Tromsø | en |
dc.publisher | University of Tromsø | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working paper series in economics and management, 2007, nr 2 | en |
dc.rights.accessRights | openAccess | |
dc.subject | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 | en |
dc.subject | bargaining | en |
dc.subject | surplus division | en |
dc.subject | asymmetry | en |
dc.subject | protocols | en |
dc.title | Bargaining with asymmetric externalities | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |
dc.type | Arbeidsnotat | en |