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dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngve
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-18T07:13:59Z
dc.date.available2007-04-18T07:13:59Z
dc.date.issued2003-12
dc.description.abstractThe paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges, and the effect such regulation has on incentives to foreclose downstream rival firms. I show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against rivals by means of non-price measures, optimal access charges must be set higher than in the case when no discrimination is possible and will always provide a positive access margin. The reason is that the level of the access charge affects incentives to practice foreclosure. The optimal access charge may, when non-price measures are not possible, be lower than marginal cost of providing access.en
dc.format.extent344691 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/918
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_729
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Tromsøen
dc.publisherUniversity of Tromsøen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series in economics and management, 2003, nr 9en
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.subjectregulationen
dc.subjectvertical relationsen
dc.subjectduopolyen
dc.subjectforeclosureen
dc.titleRegulation and foreclosureen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.typeArbeidsnotaten


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