dc.description.abstract | Assuming externalities from aquaculture to fisheries, we use a Verhulst-Schaefer model of
fish population-dynamics and production, coupled with an aquaculture production model, to
investigate effects on open-access and rent-maximising fisheries. Externalities are modelled
by letting carrying capacity, intrinsic growth rate or catchability coefficient in the fishery
depend on aquaculture production. We find that the different externalities can give opposite
effects on steady state fishing effort, yield and stock, even for only “negative” externalities.
With the catchability externality, increased unit cost of fishing can imply reduced aquaculture
production in social optimum, under reasonable assumptions. We also look at allocation
between the industries under three different management regimes for coastal areas: 1)
Aquaculture has a primary right of use; 2) Optimal management of aquaculture and fishery;
3) Fishers have a primary right of use, but may allow marine farming, possibly against
payment. | en |