Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries
Sammendrag
This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric
firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by
their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively
and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition
outcome is one between the two most efficient firms, and that this is also the preferred outcome
of a welfare maxmising authority. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcome results
in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes.
Forlag
Universitetet i TromsøUniversity of Tromsø
Serie
Working paper series in economics and management, 2006, nr 6Metadata
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