dc.contributor.author | Clark, Derek J. | |
dc.contributor.author | Sand, Jan Yngve | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-05-02T10:39:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-05-02T10:39:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006-06-26 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric
firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by
their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively
and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition
outcome is one between the two most efficient firms, and that this is also the preferred outcome
of a welfare maxmising authority. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcome results
in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. | en |
dc.format.extent | 283634 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10037/942 | |
dc.identifier.urn | URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_750 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Universitetet i Tromsø | en |
dc.publisher | University of Tromsø | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working paper series in economics and management, 2006, nr 6 | en |
dc.rights.accessRights | openAccess | |
dc.subject | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 | en |
dc.subject | endogenous coalitions | en |
dc.subject | asymmetric firms | en |
dc.subject | R&D | en |
dc.title | Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |
dc.type | Arbeidsnotat | en |