Artikler, rapporter og annet (Handelshøgskolen): Recent submissions
Now showing items 581-600 of 625
-
Minimum Quality Standards and Novelty Requirements in a One-Short Development Race
(Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2010) -
Endogenous technology sharing in r&d intensive industries
(Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2010-01-11)This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred ... -
Simultaneous versus sequential offers in dominant player bargaining
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-01-10)We consider bargaining between a number of players that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the players is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other players have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ... -
Merger and bilateral bargaining : A note
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-02-05)In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain ... -
Regional policy analysis in a simple NEG model with vertical linkages.
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-03)The paper presents a simple three-region, two-sector general equilibrium model that is used for analysing the effect of regional tax policies. The model includes exogenous asymmetry in terms of transport costs as well as a vertical industry structure that can account for endogenous location development in order to distinguish between the effect of ‘first nature’ and ‘second nature’ on the required ... -
Fishing on cold water coral reefs : A bioeconomic model of habitat-fishery connections
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-11)This paper applies a bioeconomic model in order to study different interactions between a harvested renewable resource and a non-renewable resource without commercial value that is negatively affected by the harvesting activity. This enables the analysis of for instance cold water coral habitats and their importance to commercial fish species. The fish is harvested either in a manner that does ... -
Managerial Incentives for Technology Transfer
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-03-27)This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects a firm’s incentives to transfer knowledge about technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. We consider a three-stage strategic delegation game, where there are two technologies available; one with increasing returns to scale and the other with constant returns to scale. Whilst the former is known to both firms, only the ... -
Økonomisk verdsetting av havmiljø : Anvendelse på havområdet utenfor Nordland
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-10)I sommer har konflikten om havområdene utenfor Lofoten-Vesterålen toppet seg, med sterke utspill fra fiskerhold om seismikkskyting på fiskefelt. Økende bruk av havet til ulike aktiviteter, det være seg fiske eller petroleumsvirksomhet, oppdrett, transport eller turisme, gjør at en bredere forståelse av hvilke verdier havet tilbyr er et viktig innspill i politiske avgjørelser. I dette arbeidet ... -
Sequential Bargaining with Public Intervention: The Optimal Subsidy Path
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-10)Models of sequential bargaining under asymmetric information often exhibit equilibria which are characterised by the fact that agreement is reached only with a delay and that the final (period) solution is ex ante inefficient. The latter means that agreement is not reached though it is efficient (aggregate pay off exceeds aggregate costs). In this paper we analyse how intervention by a third ... -
Petrodevelopment 2030: Socio-economic consequences of an extensive oil and gas development in the Barents Sea
(Research report; Forskningsrapport, 2007-10)The theme of this report is the regional socio-economic consequences of an extensive oil and gas development in the Barents Sea. The regional focus area includes Finnmark County and Murmansk Oblast. The introductory chapter explains the purpose of the study and the way the work has been done. The next two chapters provide a detailed account of the region and its basic characteristics. The general ... -
R&D and knowledge transfer strategies
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-04)We study the incentives for firms to share knowledge when they engage in R&D in order to make an uncertain innovation. The ini- tial stock of knowledge may be unevely distributed, and we look at how this affects the type of cooperative agreements that the firms will find it profitable to enter in to. Specifically, we consider the cases in which firms share initial knowledge only (reciprocal ... -
Bargaining with asymmetric externalities
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)We consider sequential bargaining between three firms that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the firms is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other firms have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ... -
The all-pay auction with cross-shareholdings
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)We consider an all-pay auction between several firms under asymmetric information in which each firm owns a share in its rival. We characterize the equilibrium and show how much these cross-shareholdings serve to dampen competition. Additionally, we explain why the well known relationship between the equilibrium strategies of the standard first price and all-pay auctions breaks down in our setting. -
Rational benevolence in small committees
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09)We consider a pie-splitting game involving three committee members. In response to the large literature on sequential procedures in this type of game, we propose an institution that is inspired by auction theory. The (sealed) bids of the players are proposals for a distribution of the pie and are given simultaneously. If any of the bids is preferred to all others in a pairwise comparison (i.e. ... -
Fokus på økonomien i de nordiske fiskerier. Sjarkfiske med 8-14,9 m båter i Norge
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09) -
Product and process innovation in a differentiated goods duopoly
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-09)This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D competition or cooperation, where R&D may affect both unit cost of production and the size of the market. This combination of product and process innovation is shown to allow for the reversal of some results found in earlier models that only look at one of the two types of R&D effects. We find that for a ... -
Is migration important for regional convergence? Comparative evidence for Norwegian and Swedish counties, 1980-2000
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-06)Regional convergence studies have relied on net migration data in assessing the impact of migration. With heterogeneous labour, the implied symmetrical treatment of immigration and emigration cannot be justified a priori.. Because of heterogeneity among migrants, gross migration flows may lead to considerable interregional redistribution of human capital even when net migration is zero. Moreover, ... -
Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-06-26)This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition outcome is one between the two most ... -
A note on the ecological-economic modelling of marine reserves in fisheries
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-03)This paper gives an overview of bioeconomic modelling of marine reserves, and illustrates how economists have responded to the modelling results found in the ecological literature. The economic analysis is shown to be far more pessimistic with regard to the potential of marine reserves as a fisheries management tool, than what one finds in the purely ecological analysis, the reason being the ... -
Nature reserves as a bioeconomic management tool. A simplified modeling approach
(Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-02)This paper demonstrates analytically how a nature reserve may protect the total population, realize maximum sustainable yield (MSY), maximum economic yield (MEY) and consumer surplus (CS) and how this depends on biological growth, migration, reserve size and economic parameters. The pre-reserve population is assumed to follow the logistic growth law and two post-reserve growth models are discussed. ...