This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred ...

In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain ...

This paper applies a bioeconomic model in order to study different interactions between a harvested renewable resource and a non-renewable resource without commercial value that is negatively affected by the harvesting activity. This enables the analysis of for instance cold water coral habitats and their importance to commercial fish species. The fish is harvested either in a manner that does ...

I sommer har konflikten om havområdene utenfor Lofoten-Vesterålen toppet seg, med sterke utspill fra fiskerhold om seismikkskyting på fiskefelt. Økende bruk av havet til ulike aktiviteter, det være seg fiske eller petroleumsvirksomhet, oppdrett, transport eller turisme, gjør at en bredere forståelse av hvilke verdier havet tilbyr er et viktig innspill i politiske avgjørelser. I dette arbeidet ...

The theme of this report is the regional socio-economic consequences of an extensive oil and gas development in the Barents Sea. The regional focus area includes Finnmark County and Murmansk Oblast. The introductory chapter explains the purpose of the study and the way the work has been done. The next two chapters provide a detailed account of the region and its basic characteristics. The general ...

We consider sequential bargaining between three firms that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the firms is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other firms have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...

We consider a pie-splitting game involving three committee members. In response to the large literature on sequential procedures in this type of game, we propose an institution that is inspired by auction theory. The (sealed) bids of the players are proposals for a distribution of the pie and are given simultaneously. If any of the bids is preferred to all others in a pairwise comparison (i.e. ...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D competition or cooperation, where R&D may affect both unit cost of production and the size of the market. This combination of product and process innovation is shown to allow for the reversal of some results found in earlier models that only look at one of the two types of R&D effects. We find that for a ...

This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition outcome is one between the two most ...