Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek J.
dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.
dc.contributor.authorRiis, Christian
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-03T07:55:13Z
dc.date.available2007-05-03T07:55:13Z
dc.date.issued2007-02
dc.description.abstractWe consider an all-pay auction between several firms under asymmetric information in which each firm owns a share in its rival. We characterize the equilibrium and show how much these cross-shareholdings serve to dampen competition. Additionally, we explain why the well known relationship between the equilibrium strategies of the standard first price and all-pay auctions breaks down in our setting.en
dc.format.extent149783 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10037/947
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-uit_munin_755
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Tromsøen
dc.publisherUniversity of Tromsøen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series in economics and management, 2007, nr 1en
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccess
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.titleThe all-pay auction with cross-shareholdingsen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.typeArbeidsnotaten


File(s) in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following collection(s)

Show simple item record