The all-pay auction with cross-shareholdings

dc.contributor.author	Clark, Derek J.
dc.contributor.author	Konrad, Kai A.
dc.contributor.author	Riis, Christian
dc.date.accessioned	2007-05-03T07:55:13Z
dc.date.available	2007-05-03T07:55:13Z
dc.date.issued	2007-02
dc.description.abstract	We consider an all-pay auction between several firms under asymmetric information in which each firm owns a share in its rival. We characterize the equilibrium and show how much these cross-shareholdings serve to dampen competition. Additionally, we explain why the well known relationship between the equilibrium strategies of the standard first price and all-pay auctions breaks down in our setting.	en
dc.format.extent	149783 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10037/947
dc.identifier.urn	URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_755
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Universitetet i Tromsø	en
dc.publisher	University of Tromsø	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper series in economics and management, 2007, nr 1	en
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess
dc.subject	VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212	en
dc.title	The all-pay auction with cross-shareholdings	en
dc.type	Working paper	en
dc.type	Arbeidsnotat	en